The Weekly Portion: After Winograd

The final publication of the Winograd Committee is one of the most influential events since the Second Lebanon War. The ruling of the committee can be summarized with the following words "a grave missed opportunity". We went to war and did not emerge victorious.

The war ended as it did due to a series of errors and failures:

• Our withdrawal from Lebanon was carried out without any agreement on who would fill the power vacuum. We essentially strengthened Hizbullah and enabled them to spread out and become more entrenched on the Israel-Lebanon border.
• In the 4 years preceding the war, the IDF had been neglected in general and the ground forces in particular. Cutbacks significantly affected training operations and weapons capabilities. All military efforts had become focused on policing the territories. This is how the IDF's capabilities eroded further, including the abilities of the senior military command on the ground.
• Two years before the war, a skewed change in perception swept through the military's operational approach that led people to think that air power capabilities alone were enough to stop the onslaught of rockets that rained down on northern Israel
• The war was conducted without the setting of clear strategic and operational goals by the political echelon
• The decision to launch a major ground offensive was too hesitant and gravely untimely: "A stampede" in the words of the Winograd report

The conclusions by the Winograd Committee only strengthen my stance on military issues for the past seven years.

• I firmly objected to withdrawing from Lebanon without reaching an agreement in 2000. I was virtually alone in that stance at the time. I warned that the void of our departure would be filled by Hizbullah, which essentially sat on the fence of Misgav Am and Hanita
• As a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the years 2003-2006, I warned against the budget cuts being imposed on the defense establishment and the status erosion felt by the general public towards those who served in the military.
• In December 2005, seven months before the war, I called a press conference at the Knesset to announce the conclusions found by the Subcommittee for Security Perception which I headed. I publicly warned that the IDF's strength has eroded by 30% and its operational capabilities had been severely damaged
• In February 2004, in a letter composed by myself and my colleagues Omri Sharon and Yuval Steinitz, which we addressed to the prime minister and the defense minister, I warned that a continued rocket threat from the North meant that a large-scale military operation was needed and must be prepared for from all angles
• At the start of the war, I called for such an operation that would put an end to the Katyusha barrages. I did so in a speech at the Knesset plenum (25.07.2006) and in private meetings with the defense minister, as I stated in my testimony to the Winograd Committee

The Winograd Report instructed us to consider the dangers, and be prepared for another round with Iran and its proxies in the North and in the South.

We need to strengthen and nurture the IDF. Today's IDF is not the IDF of 2006. Under Ashkenazi's leadership, it is undergoing significant improvement and returning to the older and correct morals and values. We need to enable the IDF to continue its transformation and encourage its best commanders to stay on and serve.

We must also improve the decision-making process by the political echelon, as recommended by the Winograd Committee and the Lipkin-Shahak Committee

In addition, we must commence serious negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Preventing a war is better than winning one. An agreement with the Palestinians will improve our position in the confrontation with Iran and its proxies.

Finally, we mustn't bring about a new government or a change in leadership. In actual terms, this would mean replacing the prime minister. There are those that call for this based on ethical considerations and those who call for it based on political reasons.

The damage to the country, including lost lives, by a right-wing government headed by Netanyahu, would be greater than the moral gains we could get from bringing to justice a prime minister who failed in managing a war. We must remember that many who strive to take his place, Netanyahu among them, do not a have a lesser part in the outcome failures of the war