Rosner's Domain: Newly released documents reveal how Nixon wanted Israel to attack in Syria (so Jordan will be saved)

Updated!!! Election 2009: Rosner's Poll Trend 

The tumultuous events of September 1970, in Jordan and around it, are well known to all those following Middle East history. In short: early in the month, Palestinian terrorists highjacked airplanes and landed them in Jordan. Later in the month Jordan's King Hussein launched an all out attack against Palestinian militias operating in Jordan. Later Syria sent forces to invade Jordan, Iraq was threatening to do the same, Israel was getting ready for counter-invasion, the US sent forces into the Mediterranean fearing Soviet intervention. You can read good summary here and a lengthy Time article from 1970 here.

The story was detailed in many books and articles. But now, a release of new official US documents - as part of the Foreign Relations of the United States series - provide for a whole new bucket of reading material available for those wanting to understand the inner workings of the Nixon team during this crisis. I spent four hours reading through it, and had great fun. While reading, I copied some of the highlights, and what I'll show here is the discussion within the administration regarding the best way for Israel to intervene if the need arises.

Israel was the regional power expected (and intended) to support the King in case his forces can no longer control Jordan. Syria and Iraq have threatened to intervene in the crisis, and Syria sent forces into Jordanian territory. In the 21^st of September, the administration was debating whether Israel should attack Syrian forces in Jordan, or attack in Syria itself.

The material below is copied from the original documents but was shortened, and I added some explanation where needed. It shows how this discussion evolved from eight in the morning until 12 hours later. Even if you don’t read it all, make sure not to miss the conversation between Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin.

Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 21, 8:45 a.m.

Participants: The President, Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry Kissinger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs General Alexander Haig, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Joseph Sisco.

...Dr. Kissinger stated that at 5:15 that morning [Israel’s] Ambassador [Yitzhak] Rabin had called and reported that Irbid [a Jordanian city] had fallen to the Syrian forces, that the Israeli Government did not believe their intervention should be limited to air action alone, and that they had posed a series of questions and conditions on which they would like a response within three hours. Later, at about 6:45 a.m. Ambassador Rabin had called again and stated that Israeli reconnaissance had observed Syrian units south of Irbid...

The Israelis had no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Jordan, however, they did believe that an attack in support of the King must have some “political cause” and that some adjustment of a technical nature would have to be made as a result of their attack... Among Israeli conditions were assurances that the U.S. would protect Israel against Soviet counteraction...

...Secretary Rogers then stated that the important issue was whether or not the Syrians were actually moving south with the view toward taking Amman [Jordan’s capital] or whether they intended merely to carve out an enclave in northern Jordan. Admiral Moorer [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer] stated that his intelligence suggested that a spearhead of 40 Syrian tanks was indeed moving south. Secretary Laird confirmed that military intelligence suggested that the spearhead was on a route which led to Amman.

Sisco then stated that before the Israelis move [to help the King] one of the conditions listed by them early that morning was the requirement that the King know what they were doing and be in full agreement with it... The President then stated that…The question, rather, is what effect will Israeli intervention have on the King. Secondly, what effect will Israeli intervention have on the Soviets.

It is difficult to believe that the Soviets are not aware of what the Syrians have been doing. If the Soviets were to move in the face of our messages, both public and private, then I suspect further delay on our part would be dangerous. From the King’s perspective also it should be kept in mind it is not so much a question of whether the Syrians intend to take over Amman, but rather the impact that any Syrian action is having on his morale...

...The President then noted that one option might be for the Israelis to move into Syria. Secretary Laird added that they might strike Syrian air fields. Secretary Rogers commented that in his view militarily Syria was the best target, but politically Jordan was preferable...

...The President then asked the group to consider the Syrian invasion problem, and questioned whether or not an Israeli invasion of Syria did not in effect constitute a more difficult problem. If the Israelis moved into Syria, the Soviet involvement certainly would be more likely. Secretary Rogers asked if Israeli action against Syria was the only alternative...

... Secretary Rogers then asked what we would tell Congress if we decided to go ahead with Israeli intervention... The President stated that should the question arise, we should state that we were aware of the possibility of Israeli intervention, but deny that we were working with them actively on this possibility. And finally, we should add that we understand the reasons for their action...

Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 21, 4:25 p.m.

Chairman: Kissinger, State Department: U. Alexis Johnson [Under Secretary for Political Affairs], Talcott Seelye [Country Director for Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria], Defense: David Packard [Dep. Sec. of Defense], G. Warren Nutter [Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs], James Noyes [Dep. Asst Sec. for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs], Joint Chiefs of Staff: Moorer, Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt [director of the Joint Staff], CIA: Lt. Gen. R.E. Cushman [Dep. Director], David Blee [Directorate of Operations], National Security Council: Haig, Col. Richard Kennedy [director for staff planning and coordination], Harold H. Saunders, Samuel Hoskinson, Adm. R.C. Robinson, Peter Rodman, Jeanne W. Davis,

Kissinger: ...the President has ordered that we explore with Rabin the possibility of encouraging the Israelis to move into Syria after all [instead of moving forces into Jordan] — the course which we rejected yesterday. I realize we were all united against this yesterday on political grounds, but I would like to present some of the President’s reasoning. Israeli ground intervention will be very tough on Hussein. An attack on Syria will be less dangerous to him than if it were directed against his territory. Also, it would be easier to get Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory than from Jordanian territory. If the situation unravels in Jordan, Israel could use it as a pretext to stay in. Also, it might give some help to the moderates, if there are any left in the Arab world, who could blame the Syrians for having brought on the fighting. Sisco is exploring this with Rabin.

State might look at its draft texts [for release in case of Israeli intervention] to see how they might be changed if Israel went into Syria. It may be easier to reposition things in the event of a move on Syria even though our original judgement was in the opposite direction.

Johnson: I have no judgement of the move in a military sense.

Moorer: There is a real bottle-neck at the Syrian border. Once they seal them up, they [the Syrian forces] can’t get out. Also, the Israelis could get in behind them and cut them off.

Kissinger: We all rebelled against the notion of involving another state, but the impact would be easier on the King.

Vogt: What would be the impact on the Soviets?

Moorer: The Soviets may react very differently to an attack on Syria.

Kissinger: One of the purposes of this exercise is to face them down. They will scream, and it will have to be over in 72 hours. I doubted at first the desirability of pegging the statement to the peace effort, but now that I see it, I like it. (to Mr. Seeyle) Can you consider what to say on the same general theme if Syria were invaded rather than Jordan?

Johnson: We haven’t had a chance to discuss possible [UN] Security Council action yet. That will require more careful consideration.

Seelye: This is consistent with the idea that we should seek parallel action.

Kissinger: If Israel moves into Syria, can we condemn Israel in the SC?

Seelye: We wouldn’t have to. We would just say everyone should get back to his own territory.

Kissinger: ...we can’t take a position based on a call for immediate Israeli withdrawal in the face of what we’ve done. We can’t single out Israel after we put them up to it.

Packard: We will ask everyone to get out.

Kissinger: ... we can’t deny having some prior knowledge—Israel won’t let us. On the other hand, if we go too far, it will produce the charge of collusion with all its consequences. We must strike a line between.

Seelye: We can say Israel decided independently to move and, in the light of the circumstances, we view the move sympathetically.

Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 21, 6 p.m.

Secretary Rogers... stated that Assistant Secretary Sisco had talked to Ambassador Rabin about the desirability of Israeli action against Syria within Syrian territory and the Israelis had responded very unenthusiastically about action against Syria [the report by Sisco will be a matter of dispute later]. According to Secretary Rogers the Israelis felt that it would be better politically to move against Syria but not militarily. Admiral Moorer stated that this puzzled him since action against Syria would be tantamount to cutting the rear of the enemy forces... The President asked whether or not it might not be better to approach the Israelis separately again on this issue.

...The President stated that he felt that Israeli action against Syria would give King Hussein the best break. It would be easy for the Israelis to move in and act quickly, cut off the Syrian rear, and accomplish the same thing without jeopardizing the King’s position in the Arab world as a result of his having brought Israeli forces into Jordan.

For all these reasons, the President stated, I believe it would be best to have the Israelis attack Syria. If we are unsuccessful in doing that, in light of Israeli reservations, then air action alone would probably be best.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he agreed with this analysis, but that it might be difficult to get the Israelis to stick to air action alone. However, in light of the improving military situation on the ground [Jordan was holding back the Syrians successfully], they might feel otherwise at this point in time.

Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin), September 21, 7:05 p.m.

K: There is a point of clarification I want to raise with you. What did you tell Sisco this afternoon about the alternate plan we mentioned to you this afternoon, the alternate courses of operations? [namely, attacking Syria]

R: He raised the question. He said they estimated that Jordan didn’t want ground operations in Jordan and he asked about the possibility of carrying out diversionary action in Syria. He asked my opinion. I made it very clear that diversionary operations cannot achieve anything unless the purpose is to eliminate the forces in Jordan.

K: I want to get one thing clear. Did I understand you correctly when we talked this afternoon that if a major operation was carried out in Syria, from a military point of view this was a feasible operation? You and I have to be meticulous in our understandings for this reason. What you tell me I report to the President. When another version is reported, my version must be the correct one. Otherwise there is no sense in my talking to you. I reported my understanding of the conversation this afternoon—from a purely military point of view you expressed the thought that this might be an effective and probably the effective way of doing it.

R: Exactly.

K: We were told this evening that it was your judgment that from a military point of view it was not feasible [Kissinger refers to the report on the Sisco conversation].

R: This time it is recorded. He [Sisco] talked about diversionary tactics. I went into detail and explained to him. I said to him you don’t have diversionary...

K: You don’t have to explain any more than that.

R: It is unbelievable.

K: The only essential thing is that any time you deviate, even in the slightest—which you didn’t do... I want to know when I say in a meeting “It is my belief that this is the Israeli point of view,” I want to be exactly right.

R: I said “what do you mean by diversionary?”

K: I understand.

R: I said nonsense. They have decided to move that force because they have a reason to do so. They are willing to take the risk. I don’t believe in diversionary.

K: I fully understand.

R: There were at least two people on their part and one on our part, and he came to me and said . . .

K: But they were not at the meeting with the President.

R: It becomes something that’s impossible to work.

K: It will be straightened out.

R: I tried to find out to Haig after I came back. I wanted to explain the concept of diversion.

K: You should have done that.

R: I couldn’t reach him.

K: Then you should have left word.

R: I did and was told he would call me back.

K: It doesn’t matter; no one is blaming you. Relax Mr. Ambassador. We will be back to you tonight.

R: Very strange. I didn’t write it down—someone else did.

K: We’ll confuse everybody if we keep this up. Someone has just come in. Goodbye. [The President had walked into Mr. Kissinger’s office

with Mr. Haldeman]

Kissinger-Rabin conversation continues, 7:20 p.m. [After the President left Mr. Kissinger’s office]

K: The President wants, on an urgent basis, the assessment of your government of the plan of a major attack in that region and on a diversionary attack... keep in mind some of the advice I gave you this afternoon—about cleverness.

R: Okay.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 23

Ambassador [to Jordan Dean] Brown finally was able to get in touch with the palace last night concerning our request for a clarification of King Hussein’s thoughts on Israeli ground intervention in Jordan and coordination directly with the Israelis. He had to double talk again with Zaid Rifai [Chief of the Jordanian Royal Court] who said that the King “prefers action from up high” [air force attack] and that “if anything is to be done low it should not be here but away [from Syria]”... Rifai also said that it is important for the U.S. to keep up the pressures it has already asserted and that the principal aim must be to get the Syrians withdrawn so that the Iraqi do not also get the idea they can get away with something.

Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 23, 9:30 a.m.

The President directed that the WSAG [Washington Special Action Group] carefully review the language of the U.S. response to take cognizance of these facts, noting that the situation of the moment had improved, and it may be that King Hussein does not want Israeli or U.S. air support. If this is true, the United States will have finessed the problem. In effect, the U.S. response should suggest that we do not want unilateral Israeli action but, at the same time, make it clear that we are grateful for Israeli cooperation. The President added that it was the United States which took the initiative with the Israelis on this issue and it is the Government of Israel that was most helpful in response to our request...