Rosner's Domain: Haas & Indyk: US should give Israel a nuclear guarantee and an enhanced antiballistic missile defense capability

 A new paper on US strategy in the Middle East (it is really one chapter from a more comprehensive book - read the JP news report about it here) is now available on the Saban Center's web site. Its authors, Martin Indyk of Saban, and Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, advise President-elect Obama to focus his attention first and foremost on Iran, but a "second emphasis should be on promoting peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in particular Syria, which is currently allied with Iran and its Hezbollah and Hamas". This means that in the "Syria first or Palestinians first" debate I wrote about last week, Indyk and Haas tend to join the Syrian camp (Indyk played a similar role in the Nineties, supporting a Syria-first agenda for the Israeli government).

If you do not have the time, you can read the executive summery. But the full paper (26 pages) has so much more, from which I will quote here a couple of paragraphs:

On the options if negotiations with Iran (the authors support engagement with no preconditions and the bolstering of sanctions):

Preventive military action, by either the United States or Israel, in the event that this diplomatic initiative fails, appears unattractive given its risks and costs. However, the option should be examined closely, both for what it could accomplish and given the dangers of living with a near or actual Iranian nuclear weapons capability. Because of Israel's vulnerability to an Iranian nuclear first strike, its fuse will necessarily be shorter than America's. And negotiations - as well as stepped-up sanctions - will inevitably take time to work. To increase Israel's tolerance for a more drawn-out diplomatic engagement, the next president should bolster Israel's deterrent capabilities by providing a nuclear guarantee and an enhanced antiballistic missile defense capability.

 On the way to make Russia more cooperative on Iran:

While he cannot trade away treaty commitments to eastern European states, nor sacrifice the independence of Georgia or Ukraine, the next president does have a number of incentive cards he can play to secure increased Russian buyin on Iran: Russian accession to the World Trade Organization; ballistic missile defense installations in Europe (the need for which diminishes if an Iranian nuclear threat is neutralized through U.S.-Russian cooperation); and a number of financially lucrative arrangements for Moscow, from a Russian nuclear-fuel bank to Russian involvement in an international nuclear-fuel-enrichment consortium. The president can also adjust the pace of any Georgian and Ukrainian integration with NATO.

 On conditions for no precondition talks:

Rather than making suspension of Iran's enrichment program a precondition for formal negotiations, suspension should be converted into a condition for progress in the negotiations. If Iran is willing to suspend enrichment, the UN should be willing to suspend sanctions that were invoked to achieve that purpose; if Iran is not willing to suspend enrichment, UN and multilateral sanctions should be ratcheted up in agreement with America's partners.

 On the reason for which the Syria track is tempting for Israel:

In the past Israelis sought to trade territories for peace, but that bargain was fraught because they doubted the depth of Syria’s commitment to normalizing relations. Today, facing a serious threat from Iran, Israelis are more interested in the trade of the Golan Heights for what would be tantamount to Syria's strategic realignment. If President Asad proves willing to make that shift, it would deal a body blow to Iran's interference on Israel's northern and southern borders, providing a strategic dividend to replace the devalued peace dividend Israelis used to hope for.

 On the way for the US to deal with Hamas in Gaza:

The next president should encourage that process but leave it to Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority to handle the relationship with Hamas. If the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas continues to hold, and a PA-Hamas reconciliation emerges from it, the next president should deal with the joint Palestinian leadership as well as authorize lowlevel contact with Hamas in Gaza. In the meantime, progress in the negotiating process will create its own dynamic in which Hamas will feel pressured by Gazans not to miss the peace train.

Things President Obama needs to do on the Israeli-Palestinian front:

he should also prepare the ground for the deployment of international forces (preferably Arab and Muslim) as part of a peace agreement to partner with the Palestinian forces until they can police their territory on their own. He will need to reach an understanding with the new Israeli prime minister to freeze all settlement activity for a limited period (say, six to twelve months) while the borders of the Palestinian state are finalized.

Questions for which I did not find satisfactory answers in this detaild paper:

1. What if Iran keeps refusing to freeze enrichment activities? Tehran has refused to do it when it was offered by the Bush administration in return for negotiation. Now Haas and Indyk are willing to start the talking and only later demand a freeze. Maybe it will work, but what if it doesn't? The authors admit that if negotiations fail they aren’t yet sure what should be done. Those among us more prone to think that it will, indeed, fail, can’t be satisfied by a proposal which stops short of pondering the options for the day after.

2. What if Syria wants to keep its relations with Iran as close as they are now? Will this mean an end to the Syrian track Haas and Indyk would try to pursue?

3. Why should Israel agree to the possible deployment of any force - be it Arab or international or European - in the West Bank when the international force in Lebanon fails to do the things it was supposed to do?

4. What if Hamas doesn't feel "pressured by Gazans"? What if it doesn't care about such pressure?

5. I've  already asked this question: "Is the U.S. ready to abandon the idea of a free Lebanon?" The authors say that an Israeli-Syrian agreement will "improve prospects for stability in Lebanon". I think "stability" is a code word principally saying that yes – the US is willing to abandon the idea of free and independent Lebanon. But I'd still like to hear a more detailed answer.