Rosner's Domain: Brian Katulis on hyperventilating "rifts" between Israel and the US

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I sent him a couple of questions:

1. Your paper argues that "there is no clear path forward to resolve power-sharing disputes among different Palestinian factions" - yet you believe that "A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is achievable" How?

"No clear path forward" doesn't mean it can't be done. Getting to a political consolidation among the Palestinian factions is difficult, but not mission impossible. It is also a fundamental piece for moving towards the shared goal of a two-state solution, one that is supported by the United States, Israel, and much of the rest of the world.

Competing Palestinian groups can settle their disputes through different means - violence, negotiations, a competition at the ballot box, or through some combination of these different means.

Obviously the burden for addressing these differences rests squarely on the shoulders of the Palestinian leaders and factions. The disputes within Fatah, differences among members of Palestine Liberation Organization, and the continued Fatah-Hamas tensions are things that Palestinian leaders must address. Outside actors such as Egypt can play a role in trying to facilitate discussions, but they can't force decisions on Palestinian leaders.

The efforts of outside actors, whether it is the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or other countries, have an impact on the balance of power among Palestinian factions and the strategic calculations of different Palestinian groups. For example, U.S. efforts to support Palestinian leaders through security sector assistance or economic development programs, might boost the power and credibility of certain types of Palestinian factions. Funding and support for Hamas from other parts of the Middle East have an impact on the intra-Palestinian balance of power. Israel's policies also have an impact on the landscape - for example, a number of Palestinian Authority leaders talked about the importance of easing restrictions on movement and access in the West Bank to give a boost to the economy. These leaders made their case not only for altruistic reasons - they did so in the hopes that any economic gains would help boost their popularity in the eyes of their people.

So outside actors have a role, and helping prepare a credible pathway to statehood could create an environment for resolving internal Palestinian disputes. But ultimately it is up to Palestinian leaders to figure out how they are going to rebuild a framework for sharing power and whether they can find a formula to bridges gaps like the tense divisions that remain between Fatah and Hamas.

2. You say that there's "a need for a greater effort on the part of the United States to reconcile with the Israeli public". But recent developments - notably US' demand to halt construction in Jerusalem - show that such effort hasn't yet materialized. How would you reconcile US' desire for settlement freeze with the need for more receptive Israeli public opinion?

One of the report's key recommendations is for the Obama administration to develop a comprehensive strategic communications and public outreach effort with the Israeli public.  Israel has a vibrant media that expresses a diverse range of viewpoints, and it has an informed and engaged public. In order for the Obama administration to most effectively advance its policies, one key component is to have a regular and more consistent effort aimed at engaging in the rich and complicated debates taking place in Israel.

As we say in the report, it was clear from the meetings we had in Israel that the settlement freeze issue is not the most important issue for the Israeli public - this tactical dispute didn't seem to animate Israel's internal debates or matter much to Israelis. The diplomatic engagements on settlement freezes or disputes over construction in Jerusalem will likely continue - close allies sometimes don't see eye to eye on certain issues.

But as those issues continue to be debated, the Obama administration needs to send a clear message to the Israeli public that the United States is a strong ally that will defend Israel on issues which are fundamental to its security and defense, such as how to achieve a comprehensive peace with its neighbors or to develop a strategy on Iran. Israel and the United States cannot afford to surprise each other on strategic issues such as these. In his first six months in office, President Obama has reached out directly to the Muslim world in speeches in Turkey and Egypt - at some point it could be beneficial for him to do direct outreach in Israel too.

The Obama team has been very busy engaging in a mix of quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy and sometimes quite vocal diplomacy at the official level with the Israeli government. What we suggest is a public diplomacy effort with two main goals: first, clearly explaining the U.S. strategy to Israel, with the understanding that allies may not always agree, and second, reaffirming the importance of the bilateral alliance.

3. David Rothkopf of Foreign Policy wrote last week that "getting tough with the Israelis on settlements or on other elements of the Israel-Palestine agenda will actually do precious little to address our greater concerns in the region while accepting a nuclear-capable Iran because we don't have the will to stop them from getting will damage U.S. interests in great and lasting ways.... as a potentially unprecedented rift [between the US and Israel] looms and as a shift in the politics of the relationship seems to be taking place, it's probably worth taking a deep breath and asking ourselves if we have fully thought through the consequences of what might come next. ". Do you agree?

No, I don't agree.  First, I think there has been a lot of unnecessary hyperventilating about "unprecedented rifts" between Israel and the United States, and I think our bilateral relationship is mature and stronger than that. So I'd say I have a lot more confidence in the ties between our two countries than Mr. Rothkopf seems to express in this particular statement.

Second, I don't agree with downplaying the importance of making the Arab-Israeli conflict a key priority and focus of attention. I do, however, completely agree that addressing Iran's nuclear effort is a top concern. I just don't think it's an "either-or" situation. We can handle both efforts to achieve progress on the Arab-Israeli front while dealing with Iran.

And I'm in complete agreement that it is important to think through the consequences of what might come next. It's something I wish the Bush administration had done in its Middle East policy. In part due to the strategy pursued by the previous U.S. administration, we've seen an emboldened Iran, advances by terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and close U.S. allies like Israel, Jordan, and Egypt feeling threatened.

4. You mention in your report that the administration is "is now pushing for Arab states to make significant gestures toward Israel" - but it seems that so far it has failed to achieve any success in getting the Arabs to make "gestures". Last week the NYT has reported that President Obama "failed to extract any meaningful gestures toward Israel to revive the peace process". How crucial is it that Obama succeeds, and what happens in case that Arab response doesn't seem to be forthcoming?

Getting Arab gestures would be useful and important to achieve progress, obviously. There has been a sense in some parts of the Arab world that important gestures have been made. For example, in recent trips to other parts of the Middle East and in discussions with leaders in the Arab world, I have heard a lot of disappointment that the Arab Peace Initiative, first proposed in 2002 and re-introduced in 2007, had not generated a clear response from Israel or sparked a strong debate within Israel.

But the lack of movement on getting gestures shouldn't be used as an excuse for Israelis and Palestinians to avoid meeting commitments they have made aimed at achieving progress towards a final peace settlement.

5. There are those thinking that the only way to advance to peace process is to push Israel around - and those thinking that the only way to advance peace is to make Israel feel secure, comfortable and at ease with the American administration. What's your take on this dilemma?

I think it's a false choice, and somewhat of a simplistic way of looking at a mature bilateral alliance that has endured for decades and will continue to last.

We can walk and chew gum at the same time. The United States can work to maintain and build trust with the Israeli public while taking diplomatic steps it feels is necessary to advance a two-state solution.

At times allies will have tactical disputes, particularly during turbulent periods or periods of transition and change in policy. The United States and Israel have a long list of common interests - I am struck by how both countries agree on the need to advance a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the need to address Iran's actions, and the need to address the continued threat from terrorist groups.

But the two countries are not going to always agree on everything every day of the week. That's ok, as long as both countries are doing the hard work and communications needed to maintain the bilateral relationship. Most importantly, one country should not surprise or do anything unexpected that impacts the strategic position of the other country.

6. You write that Palestinian election "will be risky and complicated, but elections may be the only way to translate improvements in security, economy, and institutional capacity into real political legitimacy for Palestinian governing institutions - the paramount strategic objective of the current efforts. While January 2010 should not be a sacred date, the elections should be held on a reasonable time frame and their results respected."

Risky indeed - are you not repeating the mistake of the Bush administration back in 2006?

The Bush administration's mistakes run deeper than just simply pushing forward with elections in 2006 - the administration did so in a context of not having a clear plan to build civilian and security institutions, particularly after Israel's disengagement from Gaza in 2005. The problem with the 2006 elections wasn't that there were elections - it was that the hard work of building Palestinian institutions and also making real progress toward a two-state solution were left undone.  There was a lot of talk but far too little action on those fronts.  It really wasn't until the last 18 months of the Bush administration that there was a concerted and somewhat organized effort to strengthen Palestinian Authority institutions, particularly in the West Bank.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad recently both called for those elections to be held in January. Abbas said the results should be respected no matter what. If Palestinian leaders continue to push for a new round of elections - tentatively discussed for early next year, then the United States, Israel and other countries should be prepared to make some decisions on how they will respond.

A key problem that remains unresolved now is the challenge of legitimacy that many Palestinian leaders face. I certainly don't think that another round of Palestinian elections is a panacea for the many challenges on the Israeli-Palestinian front.  But there are very serious questions about how much standing and support Palestinian leaders have these days, and whether a Palestinian Authority is viable without some way of gauging the will and support it has from the people.

A two-state solution is not viable if one of the parties lacks legitimacy and support from its own people. Elections are always risky, but the alternatives could be even messier - an escalation of violence among Palestinian factions in efforts to settle scores and resolve disputes over power is quite possible.

In order to achieve progress towards a two-state solution, more thought must be given to this question of how Palestinians can achieve an internal consolidation of power and settle their disputes. It's not enough to have economic development or security sector assistance efforts moving forward without more planning on how to advance a political transition among the Palestinians.

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