Point / Counterpoint: History didn't start with Netanyahu's government

Counterpoint to:

The Two-State Solution Doesn't Solve Anything  
The heart of the [Israel-Palestinian conflict] is not necessarily how to define a state of Palestine. It is, as in a sense it always has been, how to define the state of Israel."
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley
The New York Times
August 11, 2009

In the 1993 movie Groundhog Day, history stops while the previous day's events are erased, and the day is then relived in a different way. I was reminded of this movie while reading the Hussein Agha and Robert Malley opinion piece in The New York Times.

For them, it would appear, history stopped at the end of March and the events of previous Israeli governments were erased. History was then restarted in April with Binyamin Netanyahu as prime minister.

Here is Agha and Malley's version of the policies of Israel's governments:

Mr. Netanyahu conceded the principle of a Palestinian state, but then described it in a way that stripped it of meaningful sovereignty. In essence, and with minor modifications, his position recalled that of Israeli leaders who preceded him."

But much more than "minor modifications" separate Netanyahu's official position from those of Barak, Sharon and Olmert, the Israeli leaders who preceded him.

According to chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat, the Palestinians were offered a state in the West Bank, Arab East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. There were to be minor land swaps between Israel proper and about 4% of the West Bank territory located along the proposed border where the majority of Jewish settlers live.

This was the most recent deal that was negotiated by the Israeli and Palestinian teams in the post-Annapolis discussions last year, and after reaching agreement on almost all the issues the Palestinians once again walked away, just as they rejected the United Nations partition plan in 1947, the Clinton peace plan at Camp David in 2000, and the Taba offer in 2001.
 
Of their attitude, Ehud Olmert wrote in a recent Washington Post article:

To this day, I cannot understand why the Palestinian leadership did not accept the far-reaching and unprecedented proposal I offered them. ...It would be worth exploring the reasons that the Palestinians rejected my offer and preferred instead to drag their feet, avoiding real decisions. My proposal would have helped realize the 'two-state solution' in accordance with the principles of the US administration, the Israeli government I led and the criteria the Palestinian leadership has followed throughout the years."

Olmert continues: "I believe it is crucial to review the lessons from the Palestinians' rejection of such an offer," which is precisely what the Israeli electorate did when they elected the Netanyahu government.

While Netanyahu is offering less than his two predecessors, no one really expected anything else when he was elected. Israel chose a right-wing government earlier this year out of total frustration with the prospect of ever reaching a peace deal with the Palestinians.

This followed more than twelve thousand cross-border rockets fired into Israeli towns and villages from Gaza, after Israel unilaterally withdrew from the strip (mistakenly, many now say).

Agha and Malley criticize Israel's insistence that any future Palestinian state would have to be demilitarized without full control over borders or airspace, and that no Palestinian refugees would be allowed back into Israel.

But considering the history of the conflict, these demands are a vital necessity for Israel, and their outright rejection is a major obstacle for peace, as they most likely always will be.

Interestingly, while the authors have not grasped this key point, the Palestinian negotiators have.

Most Israelis now believe that Gaza is just an example of what can be expected if Israel ever hands over the West Bank to the Palestinians, except that then it would be cross-border rockets into Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion airport.

Therefore, from Israel's perspective, the control of airspace and borders by Palestinians by necessity must initially be limited, though it can grow in time as Israel gains more confidence in the Palestinians' abandonment of their aspirations to destroy their Jewish neighbors, and in their acceptance of the idea of living in peace.

Palestinian refugees will be able either to return to the new Palestinian state or they will be able to choose compensation. But there is no way that Israel could ever permit thousands or even millions of hostile belligerents to stream into its territory, no matter how these people describe their version of history.

The authors also criticize Netanyahu's demand that the Palestinians formally recognize Israel as a Jewish state - a demand that they believe is supported by most Israelis.

But it is unclear whether their belief is correct, and in actuality most Israelis may well be indifferent to how the Palestinians regard Israel, so long as they live in peace alongside it. (Even the term "Jewish state" is contentious, the original term used by Herzl having been Der Judenstaat, which in Hebrew is usually translated as "the state of the Jews", which has a very different connotation.)
 
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, in rejecting Netanyahu's demand, has stated:

It is not my job to give a description of the state. Name yourself the Hebrew Socialist Republic - it is none of my business."

While Abbas does have a point, Agha and Malley actually reinforce Netanyahu's demand when they say:

To accept Israel as a Jewish state would legitimize the Zionist enterprise that brought about their tragedy. It would render the Palestinian national struggle at best meaningless, at worst criminal."

And that is precisely why there can be no real peace until the Palestinians come to terms with the existence of the Jewish homeland next door.
 
The authors dwell extensively on the history of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and state that "over the past two decades the origins of the conflict have been swept under the carpet", but there is no other way.

Israelis and Palestinians will never agree on the history of the conflict (each have their own version), and so there is no other way of resolving the conflict other than looking forward rather than backward.

In fact, dwelling on the past is a sure way of guaranteeing another century of conflict.

Agha and Malley conclude their discussion with the statement that "the heart of the matter is not necessarily how to define a state of Palestine. It is, as in a sense it always has been, how to define the state of Israel."

But anyone who imagines that the definition of Israel is, or will ever be, on the table is fantasizing. The definition of Israel is no more on the table than is the definition of England, and probably even less so. Palestinians would do much better if they concentrated on the definition of their own state.