Building Bridges: Olmert government: Go home

The Schalit affair and the fashion in which the Olmert government handled it illustrated Ehud Olmert's shortcomings as the prime minister of what was possibly the most disappointing and inept government in the history of the country.

The Olmert government, seen as moderate and pragmatic, didn't succeed in reaching or even taking a single step toward a solution to the conflict in the national arena. Every time there was meaningful decision to be made, Olmert, Livni and Barak turned their backs on their responsibilities to the public and passed up every real chance to make progress.

Olmert cannot claim to have been surprised by the other side during his negotiations with them. As in the national dialogue, so in the matter of prisoner exchanges: the price for reaching a deal was known, and reaching an agreement depended on the prime minister's courage and determination to make painful and controversial decisions.

Negotiations with the Palestinians and Syrians have gone nowhere, and despite the price for reaching agreements with them being known to all, Olmert didn't dare come to the point of making a decision and bringing even a shred of a future peace deal before the public. Talks on the future of the two-state solution and moving towards normalized relations with Syria remain unresolved, the peace summits and rounds of talks have led nowhere.

When it comes to its policies on the ground, the Olmert government acted in complete contradiction to its public statements. The prime minister did not remove roadblocks, and succumbed to pressure exerted on him by settlers to confirm thousands of additional housing units in the West Bank. When push came to shove, he did not dare to remove a single outpost.

The Schalit affair is perhaps the most chilling example of the failed and deceitful policies of the Olmert government. Ministers - with the active help of the prime minister's wife Aliza - managed to present the false impression that they, as moderate, sane people, would approve the deal days before the new, right-wing government took over.
 
In practice, Olmert balked at bringing the well-known price for Schalit's release  to the government for approval. At the last minute, under a blanket of secrecy, he issued a statement blaming Hamas for toughening its stance.
 
Truth be told, Olmert's handling of the Schalit affair is a direct continuation of the way he handled the diplomatic arena during his tenure. Instead of facing reality and making a decision at the moment of truth, Olmert and his ministers settled for empty promises. As his tenure comes to an end, it can now clearly be said that his government's moderate and pragmatic public image turned out to be one of the greatest deceits in the history of Israeli politics.