In the Trenches: Business as usual with Iran?

The decisive month has arrived. Or has it?

G-8 leaders, meeting in July, declared September the time for reviewing Iran's nuclear status and making tough decisions.

Key G-20, G-8, and P-5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) meetings are being held in the coming weeks.

By the way, the sixth anniversary of the failed EU-initiated talks with Iran also falls this month. That dialogue began when Iran was in a much weaker position. Having just witnessed the military might of the United States on display in neighboring Iraq, it had to wonder if it was to be the next target.

By employing masterfully well-timed winks, feints and nods, the Iranians kept the Europeans engaged, while expanding the number of their centrifuges and moving ever closer to mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. Meanwhile, the US position in Iraq rapidly changed from towering strength to fear of a drawn-out conflict.

In addition, this month also marks one year since the UN Security Council adopted its last resolution, a toothless measure urging Teheran to comply with previous resolutions on its nuclear program. Recognizing that Moscow and Beijing weren't willing to up the ante at the time, other member states couldn't enact a new set of sanctions.

All along, the Europeans, joined by the Russians, insisted that the EU and UN tracks weren't going to yield results unless Washington changed course, shifting from a policy of belligerence to engagement with Teheran. Shortly after January 20, that's precisely what the US did, even going so far as to reaffirm that stance within days of the discredited Iranian election in June.

Nearly eight months of that new posture haven't done the trick, either. No, things have just gone from bad to worse.

Today, only outright apologists, ignoring the massive - and still growing - weight of evidence to the contrary, would claim that Iran is innocently pursuing a civilian nuclear energy program.

Then there were the June elections. Rigged voting, followed by a massive crackdown on street protests, was the order of the day. Arrests, beatings, torture and killings have all been documented. Any lingering claims to "legitimacy" by the Iranian regime went out the window.

And most recently, again underscoring Iran's total disregard for its image in the West, President Ahmadinejad appointed a wanted killer as the country's defense minister.

Ahmad Vahidi is one of five Iranians sought by Interpol for their role in the 1994 terrorist attack against the AMIA Jewish community center building in Buenos Aires. Eighty-five people were killed, hundreds were wounded. After a meticulous investigation by Argentine federal prosecutor Alberto Nisman, and despite a global Iranian offensive to derail the effort, Interpol approved "red notices" for Vahidi and four other Iranians. The notices call on countries to arrest them for extradition to Argentina.

Vahidi is a former commander of the Quds Force, an elite unit in Iran's Revolutionary Guards. In that capacity, he is also suspected of a central role in the 1996 attack on the US barracks, known as Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen American servicemen were killed in the strike.

When the Iranian parliament met a few days ago to approve Ahmadinejad's Cabinet choices, Vahidi received more votes than any other nominee.

So, as September unfolds, and as Iran continues to thumb its nose at the international community, what's next?

Are "crippling sanctions," an earlier US threat, around the corner?

Will the EU achieve consensus on sanctions, or be slowed down by member countries like Austria and Spain that hitherto haven't demonstrated much enthusiasm for tough measures? And would the EU move ahead alone on sanctions, recognizing its own vital role in Iran's economy, should the UN fail to endorse new steps? Or would it adopt only a slap-on-the-wrist resolution?

What about Russia? While insisting that it doesn't want to see a nuclear Iran on its southern flank, Moscow's diplomatic and arms-sales policies haven't always buttressed this view.

Would China go along? Heavily dependent on Iran for energy supplies, and invested in expanding Iran's inadequate refining capacity, is Beijing ready to jeopardize those interests for the sake of trying to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program?

And the list of key countries goes on, including Brazil, India and a number of Gulf states.

Moreover, how will the international community treat Iran's leaders as they continue to spit in the eye of UN resolutions, International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines, and human rights treaties?

Will President Ahmadinejad be welcomed in world capitals other than, say, Caracas and Pyongyang? Will he be viewed as a leader with whom business can be done and deals struck?

How will he be received when he addresses the UN General Assembly later this month? Who will be in the hall when he speaks? Who will walk out if he once again resorts to calls for the destruction of Israel, a UN member state since 1949, and denies the Holocaust, in contravention of a UN resolution on the subject? And, by contrast, who will stay and applaud his words?

Are there other US-based institutions lining up to follow the Council on Foreign Relations, Columbia University, and Quaker and Mennonite groups in providing the Iranian leader with a platform while he is in New York, lamely arguing that, unlike all others who have tried and failed, they have the unique ability to engage him in civilized dialogue and thus perhaps "tame" him?

And what about Vahidi, the defense minister? Will he be able to set foot outside Iran's borders without fear of arrest, or will he effectively be quarantined?

If the international community is serious about stopping Iran, then tough decisions can no longer be postponed.

Either Iran gets the unmistakable message that, one way or another, it will not be allowed to succeed in its nuclear ambitions, or else it continues along its current course, confident that it can pull this one off and create a game-changer once it crosses the nuclear goal line.

And a game-changer it would be.

An energy-rich Iran - in possession of the means to manufacture and deliver nuclear weapons, and led by religious zealots who believe they have a mandate from heaven - would pose a profound danger to its Arab neighbors, Israel and countries far beyond.

Whether it simply brandished its know-how to gain strategic advantage or tried to use those weapons, whether it provided dirty bombs to such proxies as Hamas or Hezbollah or shared nuclear technology with the likes of Venezuela, Iran would be in a unique position to influence regional and global events - and that cannot be a comforting prospect for the international community.

And so we watch, wait, and wonder whether this September will be different. We will soon have the answer.