Why the US and moderate Arabs need each other

Relating American interests in the larger Middle East to the US role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a necessary and sometimes controversial element of US policy making.

During the Cold War, two predominant models emerged.  Zbignew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, postulated the concept that protection of key American interests -- limiting Soviet influence and retaining access to Mideast oil -- required achieving as soon as possible a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Brzezinski and Carter saw obstacles to American interests in the continuing conflict and saw great advantages for the US in the larger region if the conflict were resolved.

The problems with this approach were many and were so evident to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who sought progress toward peace, that he decided to go it alone with Israel, much to the initial dismay of the Carter Administration.  First, it was unreal to expect all the Arabs, including the radicals, to reach peace with Israel.  Second, it put an unreasonable weight on the Israeli-Arab conflict to influence the many other conflicts and challenges in the region. And third, it was a process that would inevitably lead to undue pressure on Israel, the logic being that if this was the key to all America's problems in the region, and if as anyone could see the Arabs weren't ready, then advocates of such an approach would invariably play the mind game of telling themselves "If only Israel would make the appropriate concessions."

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