A Point of View: Why the US and moderate Arabs need each other

Relating American interests in the larger Middle East to the US role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a necessary and sometimes controversial element of US policy making.

During the Cold War, two predominant models emerged.  Zbignew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, postulated the concept that protection of key American interests -- limiting Soviet influence and retaining access to Mideast oil -- required achieving as soon as possible a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Brzezinski and Carter saw obstacles to American interests in the continuing conflict and saw great advantages for the US in the larger region if the conflict were resolved.

The problems with this approach were many and were so evident to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who sought progress toward peace, that he decided to go it alone with Israel, much to the initial dismay of the Carter Administration.  First, it was unreal to expect all the Arabs, including the radicals, to reach peace with Israel.  Second, it put an unreasonable weight on the Israeli-Arab conflict to influence the many other conflicts and challenges in the region. And third, it was a process that would inevitably lead to undue pressure on Israel, the logic being that if this was the key to all America's problems in the region, and if as anyone could see the Arabs weren't ready, then advocates of such an approach would invariably play the mind game of telling themselves "If only Israel would make the appropriate concessions."

In other words, this approach did not solve American problems but did create a rift between the US and Israel as if Israel was responsible for the absence of broader solutions.

The second model was outlined by Henry Kissinger in his two volumes on American statecraft. He described a process in which it was critical for American interests that the US-backed Israel defeat the Soviet-backed extreme Arab states -- in those days Syria and Iraq -- whenever there was conflict. This was so because the moderate Arab states -- Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States -- were closely watching the outcome of such struggles and would move in the direction of the winning side. 

In other words, the future of moderate Arab support for the US, despite the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, would depend on whether the US proved to be a stronger influence than the Soviets. And so the justification, not merely in moral terms but strategically, for strong US political, economic, and military support for Israel. It was a policy that generally carried the day, helping Israel be secure and prosper, keeping the Arab moderates on our side, and limiting Soviet influence to the extremists.

Today, America faces challenges in the region that differ in some obvious ways - most notably there is no competing superpower -- but shares the challenge of trying to make sure the moderates stay on our side. Once again there are those who argue for Brzezinski's model. If only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were resolved, then all of America's problems in the region -- particularly our oil interests, limiting the influence of Iran and other Islamic extremists -- are susceptible to solution.
 
Of course, we all would like to see a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would provide for security and independence for both peoples. And every realistic effort should be made to reach that goal. But once again, this approach puts too much weight on a conflict that is not so readily open to solution, particularly with the Palestinians spilt and because of the insidious influence of Iran and Syria. Once, unrealistically, such hopes are placed on a resolution, again the chances of Israel being excessively pressured increase dramatically. Again one is left without a solution to America's broader challenges in the region but a real potential for US-Israeli tension.
 
Instead, in the spirit of the Kissinger model, what we need is a demonstration that American support produces victories.  The Arab moderates want it. Sometimes they say so bluntly, as when the Saudi Foreign Minister early in the Second Lebanon War shockingly made clear his nation's feelings when he blamed the war on Hizbullah. The disappointment came at the end of the war when Israel did not gain a clear victory.
 
Similarly, Iran's nuclear build up frightened the moderate Arab. Though they began their own nuclear programs, what they most want is strong US leadership to stop the Iranian program. Then came the National Intelligence Estimate and  the Arab realization that US strong leadership on this issue was in question led them  to find their own way to deal with the threat -- the Saudis inviting Ahmedinejad to the Hadj in Mecca and Egypt opening diplomatic discussions with Iran.
 
We are once again living in a time where the moderate Arabs are closely watching American policymakers. They need to recognize that it is American strength, American loyalty, and America triumphs alone that will reassure the Arab world that their future safety lies in alliance with the United States. While the Arabs may be ambivalent about a future role for the US in Iraq, they will be watching to see how America conducts its policies regarding Iran's nuclear program, Israel's war with Hamas, and Hizbullah's challenge to Lebanese sovereignty.   

America steadfastness with its allies in these struggles will be the key to moderate victories in the region.