Window on Israel: Prospects for Palestinian state gloomy

Two groups of Israelis should be celebrating the problems of their antagonists. There is not necessarily an overlap between them, but the coincidence warrants some discussion.
 
The largest group of Israelis that can celebrate is that which does not want a Palestinian state. The Palestinians have created two tiny enclaves, pretty much at war with one another.
 
The Gaza portion, under the control of Hamas, seems inclined to attach itself to Egypt for supplies, but the Egyptians are showing traditional coolness. They have erected one kind of barrier or another between themselves and the Palestinians of Gaza since 1948; and now the antipathy is made even greater by the Hamas regime and its affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is those chaps we frequently see in courtroom cages while being tried for one or another kind of rebellion against the Egyptian government.
 
The West Bank portion of Palestine may be tempted to cuddle up to the Jordanians, but that possibility is hardly more promising than an Egyptian option for Gaza. The Jordanian population is already more than 60 percent Palestinian, and the king is not inclined to move in the direction of 80 percent via anything like an absorption of the West Bank.
 
We know the reception among Israelis of Mahmoud Abbas' principal demands: a return of refugees to their pre-1948 homes; and a return of Israel to something close to, if not identical with the borders as they were prior to 1967.
 
The Palestinians have worked themselves into a situation where the three countries they depend most upon (Egypt, Jordan, and Israel) are not inclined to provide more than lip service. It is not a good route toward the creation of a state.
 
Another group of Israelis who should be celebrating are those with limited tolerance for the Labor Party. The party's leader, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, is likely to have produced at least a temporary (and perhaps permanent) end to the party's glorious history. He has talked himself out of an earlier commitment to withdraw from the Olmert government upon the publication of the Winograd Committee report about the war in Lebanon. Barak said that it is not an appropriate time to upset the defense establishment by making changes in its leadership, or to upset the larger picture of Israeli politics by moving toward an election. Yet the Labor Party (chronically divided by competing factions) is wrenching itself apart. Close to half of its Knesset members have begun calling their leader a liar, manipulator, self-centered, unreliable, and other uncomplimentary things. Nine members of the Labor Party delegation in the Knesset say they will vote against anything proposed by the government.
 
That will not be enough to topple Prime Minister Olmert. But a party depends on at least a minimum of unity in order to elect its candidates. Barak's action, no matter how justified in some eyes, will write finish to Labor Party hopes in the next election, and maybe elections after that.
 
What can we say about an Israel that does not have to worry about a Palestinian state, or a Labor Party?
 
The best bet is that Israel will continue to muddle through something close to the status quo, both in international relations and domestic politics. Without a new crisis, the Olmert government can manage to survive, even if rebellious Labor Party members will keep it from innovations. There is a long wish list of programs to improve the economy and society, whose items excite one or another group of political supporters. But with a reasonably stable economy and a weak Palestine, Israel will be all right until an election is required in 2010, or called earlier in response to events not possible to predict at this time.
 
Forget about a Palestinian state, for the near and perhaps distant future. George W. Bush wants a agreement between Israel and Palestine before the end of his term, but few Israeli commentators think that is possible. Ehud Olmert is a team player, a friend of the President, and ultimately a survivor. He will go through some motions. The Palestinians are so tied up in their own fantasies and conflicts as to take the state option off our schedule.
 
Palestinian regions will remain weak. The status quo includes frequent IDF incursions into the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's stock of Palestinian prisoners is somewhere around 12,000 and rising.
 
Not all is rosy. The Hamas regime of Gaza is arming itself with more and better munitions. It is getting missiles via Egypt capable of reaching much further into Israel than at present, as well as anti-aircraft missiles. They will complicate the task of the IDF's helicopters over Gaza, and if they find their way into Israel they can threaten international travelers.
 
Hamas will continue to have its own problems. Its leaders should notice what Israel did to Lebanon in 2006. If that kind of force is unleashed against Gaza, the damage could be much greater insofar as Gazans do not have the possibility of fleeing warfare with the ease of Lebanese.
 
Israel also has a powerful weapon that is not overtly deadly. Its recent suspension of supplies to Gaza was temporary, but seemed to end Hamas' enthusiasm for firing rockets against Sderot. The rate dropped from more than 50 per day to a handful every few days. Hamas says it wants supplies only from Egypt, and the Egyptian government has responded with something like an assent. But the infrastructure for full supply from Egypt will not be easy to create. Egypt is a poor country with problems of supplying its own population. The enthusiasm expressed for Palestine by its media may not be enough to keep the Gazans in food, electricity, fuel, and other goodies.
 
A concern for their own population has never been a major priority for Palestinian leaders. The prospects of letting go with some missiles that will reach Tel Aviv may be the greatest of their fantasies. If they do anything like that, however, they are likely to encounter a lot of their compatriots when they get to Paradise.