Window on Israel: From one crisis to another

One definition of a good agreement is that no partner really likes it. That pretty much sums up how Israel and Hamas are viewing the terms of a cease fire for Gaza.

It does not give either partner what they had described as non-negotiable demands.

Voices on all sides are saying that the principle of a Hamas-Israeli agreement is intolerable, and that the details are lousy.

Hamas spokesmen do not expect Israel to honor the agreement.

For Israelis, the agreement depends on Hamas controlling rivals for the leadership of Islamic radicalism, who may wish to provoke Israel with a rocket or two, and on Egypt to limit the inflow of arms to Hamas.

Members of Israel's military and political elite say that the agreement is fragile, and is not likely to last beyond a few days.

Some describe it is a sell-out; an agreement with arch-terrorists that will prevent Israel from insisting that other governments not deal with Hamas. We hear that it is the product of a prime minister who will do anything to keep his job, and a defense minister who will do anything to advance his chances to become prime minister.

The agreement does not keep Israel from continuing its campaign against their Hamas' allies in the West Bank.

It does not assure the freeing of captured IDF soldier Gilad Schalit. It is not expected to cut the flow of arms to Hamas via Egypt, or to limit the capacity of Hamas to improve its political and military capacity to deal more forcefully with Israel in the future.

The several partners to the agreement (Israel, Hamas, other Islamic movements, and Egypt) are purveying different interpretations of what is agreed, and what will remain for further negotiations. None of this adds to optimism.

Those of you who think Hamas has won can volunteer to clean up the rubble in Gaza. Be warned, however, that such altruism might provide quicker rewards in the world to come than in this world. Visitors might find themselves caught in the squabbles between Hamas and its rivals, or facing the onslaught of Israeli tanks and aircraft.

Israel has killed more than 500 Palestinians since the Annapolis meeting in November, and the number of prisoners in Israeli hands is somewhere in the range of 12,000.

Those numbers, and the meager flow of supplies let into Gaza, may explain why Hamas has agreed.

Israel's reasons are more complex: to give the people living near Gaza a respite from the mortars and rockets; to give Egypt a chance as a mediator; to strengthen support within Israel and elsewhere for the military campaign that may come.

No one that I have heard is saying that the agreement is a first step toward peace.

I recall one cease fire that lasted from 6 AM to 11 AM of the same day. We will see if this does better.

Among the possibilities:

1) If it fails, it will unite Israel in a campaign to move more forcefully against Hamas.

2) In that event, we can count on both Israel and Hamas to blame the other. The Israeli and international left will find support for its view that Israel does not depart from the policy of conquest. Others will find support for their view that agreements with Arabs are not worth the value of their paper.

3) Whether the agreement fails, or stumbles on imperfectly, I will find support for my view that there is no solution to Israel's basic problem. It has to cope from one crisis to another. The point is not to make things worse. Heroic actions are seldom successful. Doubters should consider Iraq.

4) The goal is to maintain and improve Israel's standing among the civilized, and to enjoy decent relations with them.

So far, so good. The European Community has upgraded Israel's status among non-members; candidates for the American presidency are competing with good words about their friendship; life is more than tolerable.

Not everybody loves us, but we have known that for a long time.