A Link in the Chain: Israel's next strategic decision

Annapolis initiated two parallel processes: comprehensive and detailed negotiations in working groups over a Permanent Status Agreement (PSA) and implementation of the Roadmap. It seems that this approach is based on a logic that attempts to bypass the disagreements between the sides over the principles of Permanent Status.

However, a big crisis with the Palestinians is inevitable and will occur no later than the beginning of next summer. By then, most of the working groups will be deadlocked and will turn to the political echelon to make decisions.

The expected deadlock is due to several structural reasons. I have discussed these in past posts and Reut has written about them extensively. The main points are :

1. Any significant political progress will lead to a political crisis in Israel;

2. Mahmoud Abbas is politically weak;

3. There is an absence of agreement on most of the outstanding issues, most of which have not been resolved and require exhaustive negotiations and historic decisions (such as air space, division of water resources, economic agreements among others);

4. There is no strategy for dealing with Hamas, especially if it becomes part of the PA and shares power with Fatah.

Moreover, the sides will find it difficult to simultaneously advance towards a PSA and a Palestinian State in Provisional Borders (PSPB) (as per the 2nd stage of the Roadmap) as the Annapolis Declaration apparently requires. This is because many of the issues bound up with the establishment of a PSPB are also considered to be issues for a PSA (political status, economic and security arrangements and others...)

At the moment of strategic decision, this spring or beginning of the summer, Israel will have to choose between three political alternatives.

1. Continuing the Package Approach of negotiations over a comprehensive and detailed PSA - This alternative means putting all the Prime Minister's political capital in the basket of a PSA. This is an 'all or nothing' step whose failure will have far reaching consequences. Due to the structural problems of negotiations, this option is likely to end in bitter disappointment.
2. Moving to establish a PSPB based on the political process whose logic is building the capacity, powers and authorities of the PA's institutions - This alternative reduces the goals and dangers of the political process in comparison to the Package Approach option. Its main point is the systematic transfer of powers and authorities from Israel to the PA and the building of its institutions so the PA will approach the status of a PSPB towards the end of 2008. At the same time, Israeli might be able to unilaterally declare it to be a State or to reach an agreement on this with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen).
3. Grounding the Status Quo - This alternative's logic is grounding the political status without attempting to achieve a political breakthrough with the Palestinians during the terms of Olmert or Abu Mazen.

Each of these alternatives has a several advantages and disadvantages that need analysis. However, it is clear that without the intention or ability to make historic decisions of far reaching significance, there can be no meaningful progress on the negotiation channel that began at Annapolis.

In my opinion, at that moment of decision, the tendency will be to reject an all or nothing attempt to achieve a comprehensive detailed PSA. Preference may thus given to the alternative of upgrading the PA's status through building its powers, authorities and institutions based on the Blair - Fayyad axis. The new organizing logic will be to bring about the establishment of a PSPB based on Israeli and international recognition and commitment to continue the political process.