A Link in the Chain: A crisis for Zionism?

The recent elections in Israel exposed a new low point in its prolonged crisis of governance and leadership - a crisis rooted in an electoral system which generates constant instability, a fragmented Knesset and ineffective governance.

Reforming the electoral system should be a top priority for the next government. The first step is simple: the head of the largest party should be the prime minister without needing a vote of confidence from the Knesset.

The symptoms of Israel's crisis are evident. In the past decade, approximately ten different people served as ministers with major portfolios such as finance, infrastructure, transportation or communications. These short tenures compromised the ability to design and implement policy. As General Giora Eiland, former national security adviser, frames it: "designing policy in Israel is like writing poetry while standing on a ball."

The diagnosis is also clear: Israel suffers from a harsh - potentially tragic - mismatch between the complexity of the challenges it faces and the weakness of its institutions. The challenges are daunting and require a capacity to design policies and to implement them through sustaining cross-agency collaboration. At the same time, Israel's electoral system generates strong incentives for short-term, sectarian and populist conduct. Hence, frustrations are justified.

International organizations confirm that Israelis have a good reason to be dissatisfied with their public sector. For, example, according to the 2006 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum Israel is ranked fifteen in the world in its overall level of competitiveness. Yet, its business sector is ranked 8th in terms of its sophistication, availability of human capital or technology, while its public sector performance is ranked 29th. No other developed country suffers from a similar gap.

However, Israel often makes progress when crises arise. A prominent example is the successful 'Stability Package' of 1985, which came after a prolonged economic crisis which included hyper-inflation, a collapse of the banking system and a decade of missed opportunities for growth.

The Knesset's ability to govern fluctuates. About a quarter of the MKs do not get reelected in every election - compared to less than five percent of American politicians. Less than half of them feel secure about their position. Hence, understandably, as they cling to their chairs during the first half of their tenure, governments tend to be stable and strong. At the same time, as they increasingly electioneer during the second half, our governments tend to spin out of order and control. Not a single Knesset has ever disbanded during its first year and only two did during the second.

This backdrop clarifies the riddle of Olmert's tenure. He was 'lucky' that the Second Lebanon War took place during his first year in office and 'unlucky' that his legal situation deteriorated during the third year. Had it been the other way around, he would have probably transcended all legal challenges but would have been ousted due to a failed war in the third year.

The opportunity before us stems from a combination of two powerful forces: the sense of urgency and the simplicity of the solution. These elections amplified the weaknesses of our electoral system against the backdrop of a confluence of economic and national security crises. The small group of academics and insiders that has carried the message during the past years has now grown to include many politicians, the media and the public. There is ripeness for reform.

Furthermore, there is a simple way to upgrade our governance and to create the incentives that are conducive to long-term, broad and substantive conduct. The head of the largest party should be directly appointed as prime minister without needing to establish a coalition of 61 MKs and passing a vote of confidence by the Knesset as is required today. This simple amendment would give a significant advantage to the large parties and encourage voters to support them. At the same time, we have to preserve the principle of constructive non-confidence, which establishes that only 61 MKs can topple the government.

Hopefully, out of the constitutional ashes of our existing electoral system a new and improved Israeli system of governance will emerge.

It is the most pressing Zionist challenge of our time.